Purpose -This paper aims to assess the outcome of EU deregulation and competition policies on the competitive conditions of the main EU banking markets.
Introduction
Competition is generally considered a positive force in most industries; it is supposed to have a positive impact on an industry's efficiency, quality of provision, innovation and international competitiveness. However, this issue has always been controversial in banking, as the perceived benefits derived from increased competition have to be weighted against the risks of potential instability. As a consequence, the banking industry has been historically heavily regulated. Furthermore, the existence of frictions in banking markets (for example, entry barriers and asymmetric information), cause the welfare theorems associated with perfect competition not to be directly applicable and allow room for the exercise of market power (Vives, 2001 ). Nevertheless, a healthy degree of rivalry is considered necessary for the dynamic efficiency of an industry and this principle is at the basis of the trend towards fostering greater competition in banking markets all over the world.
In the European Union (EU) in particular, the past twenty years saw substantial deregulation of financial services, together with the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the introduction of the euro. These changes were aimed at fostering integration, removing entry barriers and promoting both competition and efficiency in the EU banking industry. However, several studies (ECB, 2008) have highlighted that the progress of the Single Market in financial services has been slow, particularly in the retail sector, and this calls into question the competitive conditions of EU banking markets. The European Commission (EC) is in charge of competition policy at the EU level, particularly in the areas of antitrust, cartels, mergers and acquisitions and the granting of state aid to financial institutions. Despite several landmark decisions in recent years, the task of the EC's direct involvement in fostering competition is now constrained by the need of finding solutions to the current financial crisis. The presence of a possible trade-off between competition and stability has always played an important role at a policy level and gained even more prominence in light of recent events.
Questions remain as to whether a certain degree of market power would be beneficial in banking to provide incentives for banks to undertake less risky strategies. In this context, the evaluation of competitive conditions and market power becomes increasingly important for policy-makers and regulators. Competition authorities often rely on the validity of the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm and proxy competition with measures of market concentration, such as the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI).
On the other hand, recent academic studies have shown concentration to be a poor proxy for competition. In this paper, we review the different methods proposed in the academic literature to assess the competitive conditions of banking markets. We then present the results of an empirical analysis of the dynamics of competition in EU banking markets since the year 2000. Concentrating on the commercial banking sector of the five largest EU banking markets (France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK), we test the degree of competition by using both structural (concentration ratios, HHI) and non-structural methods (the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic and the Lerner index).
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the main regulatory changes that aimed at fostering integration and competition in the EU. Section 3 briefly illustrates the design of competition policy at the EU level. Section 4 discusses the measurement of competition in the banking industry whereas Section 5 presents the results of the empirical analysis. Section 6 concludes.
Deregulation policies and competition in the EU banking markets
At the beginning of the 1990s it was a widespread belief that the banking sector in Europe would enter a period of increased competition: the advent of the EMU and the introduction of the Euro in 1999 were expected to reinforce the pressure for the reduction of existing excess capacity and lead to increased internationalisation and geographical diversification, as well as to increased conglomeration and mergers and acquisitions.
Regulatory developments have been an important factor shaping the structure of European banking markets. From 1 January 1993 the European legislation (Maastricht Treaty) created the 'largest and most open banking market in the world', by eliminating or lessening existing barriers and by introducing the single EU market for financial services. A number of studies have tried to estimate the potential welfare gains resulting from the completion of the single market. The Cecchini/Price Waterhouse (1988) study was the first to analyse comparative competitive conditions across EU banking and financial systems. Their main assumption was that the single market would induce a series of integration effects that would promote the efficiency and competitiveness of EU firms through two channels: increased market size and heightened levels of competition.
Twenty years after the publication of the Cecchini/Price Waterhouse findings, a number of studies have attempted to assess the impact of the EU regulatory intervention on banking sectors. Recent empirical evidence suggests that the sustained legislative changes at the EU level, have contributed towards the integration of European banking and financial markets (Goddard et al., 2007) . There is some evidence of integration in money, bond and equity markets (Baele et al., 2004) and in wholesale banking (Cabral et al., 2002) . However, most empirical studies suggest that significant barriers to the integration of retail banking markets still exist (Berger et al., 2001 and 2003) .
One of the effects of the regulatory changes (see Table 1 ) was to spur a trend towards consolidation, resulting in the recent wave of mergers and acquisitions. From a policy point of view, it is difficult to know what impact these structural developments are likely to have on the competitive environment and how they may influence the efficiency and stability of banking markets. On the one hand, increased concentration is expected to intensify market power and therefore hinder competition. On the other hand, it might be argued that if bank mergers and acquisitions are driven by economies of scale, then increased concentration may foster efficiency improvements. This indicates the importance of the assessment of competition in the industry, as well as the policies relevant to its maintenance. The issue concerning increased market concentration and its effect on competition and, indirectly, stability of the EU banking sector is of relevance in a period of renewed regulatory efforts to remove the remaining barriers and of increased domestic and cross border M&As.
<Insert Table 1 Within the European Commission, the competition department works to enhance competition in EU banking, insurance and securities markets. As stated in the White Paper (2005 Paper ( -2010 , the aim of the Commission's competition policy is to "use competition pro-actively to indentify and help tackle barriers in the Single Market".
Competition policy in the EU banking sector
In general terms, competition policy means "applying rules to make sure that companies compete with each other and, in order to sell their products, innovate and offer good prices to consumers" (Todd, 2007) . The current unified competition policy at the EU level (with the Commission as chief enforcer) is based on the 2004 Commission reform on merger control (the 'EC Merger Regulation' [1] ) that intended to provide a "level playing field" in a "one-stop shop" [2] for the examination of mergers with a "community dimension". According to this legislation, operations which would significantly impede effective competition, in particular as a result of the creation or strengthening of a dominant position, would be declared incompatible with the common market. For operations below specific thresholds of turnover and sales, it is usually the national competition authorities in the EU member states to review the case and enforce competition policy [3] .
In recent years, the role of the competition department within the European Commission has evolved to become increasingly 'pro-active': the Commission has carried out specific inquiries in sectors that are still characterised by high barriers to competition. For example, in 2007 an inquiry on the retail banking sector [4] highlighted a number of concerns, particularly in the European payments cards industry and credit database.
The application of competition policy typically relates to: a) mergers, b) cartels, c) abuse of dominant position (antitrust) and d) state aid. Regulatory concerns over mergers and cartels have always played an important role in the EU. In the light of recent market developments, state aid is becoming an increasingly topical issue.
a. Domestic and Cross-Border Mergers
By creating or strengthening a dominant player, the outcome of a merger may result in reduced competition, which may harm consumers through higher prices, reduced choice or decreased innovation. The objective of the competition department is to examine proposed mergers and to prevent harmful effects to consumers. Mergers are examined at the EU level if they go beyond the national borders of a member state or if the combined entity exceeds a specified threshold in terms of global and European sales. If these conditions are not met, then the national competition authorities in each member state are responsible to review the merger. Carletti et al. 2007 ). The new directive that resulted ("the Qualifying Holdings Directive") is due for implementation in March 2009. Although it represents a significant step towards ensuring greater transparency and legal certainty in the supervisory control, it still has some pitfalls, particularly in the form of lack of transparency and excessive discretion of the supervisory authorities (Carletti and Vives, 2008) .
b. Cartels
An important role in the application of competition policy is played by cartels. A cartel is defined as a group of similar, independent firms which collude to pursue price fixing, to limit production or to share markets or customers between them. Cartels are illegal under EU competition law. Action against cartels is a type of antitrust enforcement. Evidence of cartels is not easy to find. 
d. State aid
Finally, the Commission controls whether government intervention or state aid causes any distortion in competition and intra-community trade by providing an unfair advantage to specific firms. As pointed out by Carletti and Vives (2008) , this area is particularly relevant for the banking sector because of the availability of a lender of last resort. Besides, the events associated with the current financial and banking crisis make it a topical issue. A temporary framework has currently been adopted by the Commission to give member states "the opportunity to tackle the effects of credit squeeze on the real market shares and concentration levels because "they provide useful first indications of the market structure and of the competitive importance of both the merging parties and their competitors" (Art. 14). Specifically, the Commission first defines the relevant geographic and product markets and then applies the market share and HHI rules, as illustrated in Table 2. <Insert Table 2 about here>   Table 2 essentially shows that post-merger entities that are presumed to obtain large or very large market shares and HHI are considered a real competitive concern by the Commission. These simple measures of market structure are often used by competition authorities all over the world, including the US Federal and Trade Commission and the Department of Justice.
The approximate 'rules' reported in Table 2 clearly suggest that the authorities assume a negative (positive) correlation between market concentration and competition (market power). In other words (although a relationship with profits is not tested) they assume the validity of the traditional industrial organization theory known as structure conductperformance (Bain, 1951) . This theory has been challenged in the literature because it does not measure competition but it is based on the assumption that concentration weakens competition by fostering collusion among firms and ignores the argument that firms maybe more profitable because of greater efficiency [5] . Dick and Hannan (2008) make two sets of observations: first, that the simple "HHI rule" is used as a way to easily identify the cases that need further and more comprehensive scrutiny. Second, they claim that one possible reason of the use of unsophisticated methods in competition analysis on the part of the authorities is associated with industryspecific issues. Namely, it relates to the difficulties arising in the definition of inputs and outputs for banks. Finally, other possible reasons include for instance, the presence of high switching costs in banking; and the difficulties in defining the geographic markets and relevant consumers.
Recent academic works seems to favour the so-called non-structural approaches to bank competition developed in the context of the New Empirical Industrial Organisation (NEIO) literature. They posit that factors other than market structure and concentration may affect competitive behaviour, such as entry/exit barriers and the general contestability of the market (Baumol et al. 1982; Bresnahan, 1989; Panzar and Rosse, 1987) . Moreover, differently from structural methods, the competitive environment is not implied but is usually measured, as with the price mark-ups approach (the Lerner index of monopoly power and conjectural variations models) and the correlations of input costs with output prices (the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic).
Probably the most important advantage of non-structural approaches is that they do not assume a priori that concentrated markets are not competitive because contestability may depend on the extent of potential competition (see also Goddard et al., 2001: 81) and not necessarily on market structure. Another advantage of non-structural models is that there is no need to specify a geographic market, since the behaviour of individual banks gives an indication of their market power.
Competition patterns in European banking
The following sections present the results of the analysis of competitive conditions in the largest five EU banking markets since the year 2000. Focusing on the commercial banking sector of France, Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK, we test the degree of competition by using both structural (concentration ratios, Herfindhal Hirshman Indices) and non-structural methods (the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic and the Lerner index. The data are derived from BankScope, a global database published by Bureau Van Dijk [6] . We restricted the investigation to commercial banks as there are still significant differences in the retail market structure among EU member states and in some countries the saving banks sector is still partially benefiting from state help [7] .
Process of consolidation in the EU banking sector
Since the year 2000, the aggregate number of credit institutions in the EU declined Table 3 shows the means of the structural indicators of market concentration across our sample of EU countries for all banks over the period [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] . The HerfindahlHirshman Index (HHI) represents the market share in terms of total assets of every bank in the market whereas the CR-5 indicates the market share of the five largest banks.
<Insert Table 3 We also calculated the HHI for the sub-sample of commercial banks on total assets. Again, the data show that national conditions still vary considerably across countries (see Figure 1 ) and this is reflected in the different market structures of the retail banking industry in general and of the commercial banking industry in particular. Most countries, however, experienced an increase in concentration during the period of analysis and this might be also reflected in their measures of competition and market power.
<Insert Figure 1 about here>
Competition patterns in European banking: H-statistic and Lerner index
Following the established empirical literature, we estimate competition in the five EU banking markets using the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic and the Lerner index.
The Lerner index (Lerner, 1934) is an indicator of the degree of market power and it is a well established measure of competition in the banking literature. It represents the extent to which market power allows firms to fix a price (p) above marginal cost (mc) [8] . The Lerner index is defined as (p -mc)/p; a value of the index equal to zero indicates perfect competition, while a value of one indicates monopoly.
The H-statistics, on the other hand, is an indicator of the degree of market competition developed in the context of the NEIO (Panzar and Rosse, 1987) . The H-statistic exploits the relationship between input prices and equilibrium revenues and it is calculated using a reduced form revenue equation that measures the sum of elasticities of total revenues with respect to the firm's input prices. It is based on the premise that monopoly theory implies that the revenue of a monopolist falls as marginal cost rises and therefore the Hstatistics is interpreted as follows: H is equal to zero or negative when the competitive structure is a monopoly or a perfectly colluding oligopoly. When H is equal to 1, it indicates perfect competition; and 0<H<1 indicates monopolistic competition. H can be interpreted as a continuous measure of the level of competition, in particular between 0 and 1, in the sense that higher values of H indicate stronger competition than lower values [9] . Table 4 shows the evolution of marginal costs and of the Lerner index over the sample period. Measuring market power is fundamental to the analysis of bank competition: the lower the competition faced by a bank (or any other firm), the greater its market power, reflected by its ability to set price above marginal costs.
<Insert Table 4 <Insert Table 5 about here> Table 5 reports the estimated H-statistics: results indicate monopolistic competition in all countries [10] and ranges from 0.3715 in France to 0.7783 in Germany [11] . Therefore, competition in the commercial banking sector seems the highest in Germany, Spain and the UK, followed by Italy and France. These results are consistent with the current literature, which finds monopolistic competition to be the prevalent market structure in European countries [12] . To validate our results, we conducted the equilibrium test for all the banking markets and found that the banking systems were in long-run equilibrium in the period of study [13] .
Overall, the empirical analysis has highlighted that the main EU banking markets are becoming progressively more concentrated and that there is no evidence of an increase of competitive pressure over the period. Further, country differences are also apparent thereby indicating that despite the sustained regulatory intervention in the EU banking markets, significant barriers to the integration of retail banking markets still exist.
The empirical analysis seems to provide further evidence that concentration is not necessarily a good proxy for competition. Indeed, one of the least concentrated banking markets in the EU is Italy; however both the Lerner index and H-statistic estimation indicate low competitive conditions.
Conclusions
Over the past twenty years, the deregulation and market integration processes have been a steady feature of EU banking markets and have given way to profound transformations and restructuring, which materialised in enhanced consolidation. The issue concerning increased market concentration, its effect on competition and, indirectly, stability of the EU banking sector is of relevance in a period of renewed regulatory efforts to remove the remaining barriers and of increased domestic and cross-border M&As. The White Paper (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) declared the aim of the Commission's competition policy to "use competition pro-actively to identify and help tackle barriers in the Single Market".
However, our empirical analysis has highlighted significant country differences, thereby indicating that despite the sustained regulatory intervention, substantial barriers to the integration of retail banking markets still exist. Further, results show that the main EU banking markets are becoming progressively more concentrated and that there is no evidence of an increase in competitive pressure over the period. The EU Commission, as well as national competition authorities typically rely on market share and concentration levels to infer competitive conditions (the 'HHI rule'). However our empirical analysis, in line with recent literature, seems to provide further evidence that concentration is not necessarily a good proxy for competition. . Table 4 Marginal 
